Network Working Group C. Rigney
Request for Comments: 2869 Livingston
Category: Informational W. Willats
Cyno Technologies
P. Calhoun
Sun Microsystems
June 2000
RADIUS Extensions
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes additional attributes for carrying
authentication, authorization and accounting information between a
Network Access Server (NAS) and a shared Accounting Server using the
Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) protocol
described in RFC 2865 [1] and RFC 2866 [2].
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .......................................... 2
1.1 Specification of Requirements ................... 3
1.2 Terminology ..................................... 3
2. Operation ............................................. 4
2.1 RADIUS support for Interim Accounting Updates.... 4
2.2 RADIUS support for Apple Remote Access
Protocol ........................................ 5
2.3 RADIUS Support for Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) .................................. 11
2.3.1 Protocol Overview ............................... 11
2.3.2 Retransmission .................................. 13
2.3.3 Fragmentation ................................... 14
2.3.4 Examples ........................................ 14
2.3.5 Alternative uses ................................ 19
3. Packet Format ......................................... 19
4. Packet Types .......................................... 19
5. Attributes ............................................ 20
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5.1 Acct-Input-Gigawords ............................ 22
5.2 Acct-Output-Gigawords ........................... 23
5.3 Event-Timestamp ................................. 23
5.4 ARAP-Password ................................... 24
5.5 ARAP-Features ................................... 25
5.6 ARAP-Zone-Access ................................ 26
5.7 ARAP-Security ................................... 27
5.8 ARAP-Security-Data .............................. 28
5.9 Password-Retry .................................. 28
5.10 Prompt .......................................... 29
5.11 Connect-Info .................................... 30
5.12 Configuration-Token ............................. 31
5.13 EAP-Message ..................................... 32
5.14 Message-Authenticator ........................... 33
5.15 ARAP-Challenge-Response ......................... 35
5.16 Acct-Interim-Interval ........................... 36
5.17 NAS-Port-Id ..................................... 37
5.18 Framed-Pool ..................................... 37
5.19 Table of Attributes ............................. 38
6. IANA Considerations ................................... 39
7. Security Considerations ............................... 39
7.1 Message-Authenticator Security .................. 39
7.2 EAP Security .................................... 39
7.2.1 Separation of EAP server and PPP authenticator .. 40
7.2.2 Connection hijacking ............................ 41
7.2.3 Man in the middle attacks ....................... 41
7.2.4 Multiple databases .............................. 41
7.2.5 Negotiation attacks ............................. 42
8. References ............................................ 43
9. Acknowledgements ...................................... 44
10. Chair's Address ....................................... 44
11. Authors' Addresses .................................... 45
12. Full Copyright Statement .............................. 47
1. Introduction
RFC 2865 [1] describes the RADIUS Protocol as it is implemented and
deployed today, and RFC 2866 [2] describes how Accounting can be
performed with RADIUS.
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This memo suggests several additional Attributes that can be added to
RADIUS to perform various useful functions. These Attributes do not
have extensive field experience yet and should therefore be
considered experimental.
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [3] is a PPP extension
that provides support for additional authentication methods within
PPP. This memo describes how the EAP-Message and Message-
Authenticator attributes may be used for providing EAP support within
RADIUS.
All attributes are comprised of variable length Type-Length-Value 3-
tuples. New attribute values can be added without disturbing
existing implementations of the protocol.
1.1. Specification of Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4].
An implementation is not compliant if it fails to satisfy one or more
of the must or must not requirements for the protocols it implements.
An implementation that satisfies all the must, must not, should and
should not requirements for its protocols is said to be
"unconditionally compliant"; one that satisfies all the must and must
not requirements but not all the should or should not requirements
for its protocols is said to be "conditionally compliant."
A NAS that does not implement a given service MUST NOT implement the
RADIUS attributes for that service. For example, a NAS that is
unable to offer ARAP service MUST NOT implement the RADIUS attributes
for ARAP. A NAS MUST treat a RADIUS access-request requesting an
unavailable service as an access-reject instead.
1.2. Terminology
This document uses the following terms:
service The NAS provides a service to the dial-in user, such as PPP
or Telnet.
session Each service provided by the NAS to a dial-in user
constitutes a session, with the beginning of the session
defined as the point where service is first provided and
the end of the session defined as the point where service
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is ended. A user may have multiple sessions in parallel or
series if the NAS supports that, with each session
generating a separate start and stop accounting record.
silently discard
This means the implementation discards the packet without
further processing. The implementation SHOULD provide the
capability of logging the error, including the contents of
the silently discarded packet, and SHOULD record the event
in a statistics counter.
2. Operation
Operation is identical to that defined in RFC 2865 [1] and RFC 2866
[2].
2.1. RADIUS support for Interim Accounting Updates
When a user is authenticated, a RADIUS server issues an Access-Accept
in response to a successful Access-Request. If the server wishes to
receive interim accounting messages for the given user it must
include the Acct-Interim-Interval RADIUS attribute in the message,
which indicates the interval in seconds between interim messages.
It is also possible to statically configure an interim value on the
NAS itself. Note that a locally configured value on the NAS MUST
override the value found in an Access-Accept.
This scheme does not break backward interoperability since a RADIUS
server not supporting this extension will simply not add the new
Attribute. NASes not supporting this extension will ignore the
Attribute.
Note that all information in an interim message is cumulative (i.e.
number of packets sent is the total since the beginning of the
session, not since the last interim message).
It is envisioned that an Interim Accounting record (with Acct-
Status-Type = Interim-Update (3)) would contain all of the attributes
normally found in an Accounting Stop message with the exception of
the Acct-Term-Cause attribute.
Since all the information is cumulative, a NAS MUST ensure that only
a single generation of an interim Accounting message for a given
session is present in the retransmission queue at any given time.
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A NAS MAY use a fudge factor to add a random delay between Interim
Accounting messages for separate sessions. This will ensure that a
cycle where all messages are sent at once is prevented, such as might
otherwise occur if a primary link was recently restored and many
dial-up users were directed to the same NAS at once.
The Network and NAS CPU load of using Interim Updates should be
carefully considered, and appropriate values of Acct-Interim-Interval
chosen.
2.2. RADIUS support for Apple Remote Access Protocol
The RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) protocol
provides a method that allows multiple dial-in Network Access Server
(NAS) devices to share a common authentication database.
The Apple Remote Access Protocol (ARAP) provides a method for sending
AppleTalk network traffic over point-to-point links, typically, but
not exclusively, asynchronous and ISDN switched-circuit connections.
Though Apple is moving toward ATCP on PPP for future remote access
services, ARAP is still a common way for the installed base of
Macintosh users to make remote network connections, and is likely to
remain so for some time.
ARAP is supported by several NAS vendors who also support PPP, IPX
and other protocols in the same NAS. ARAP connections in these
multi-protocol devices are often not authenticated with RADIUS, or if
they are, each vendor creates an individual solution to the problem.
This section describes the use of additional RADIUS attributes to
support ARAP. RADIUS client and server implementations that implement
this specification should be able to authenticate ARAP connections in
an interoperable manner.
This section assumes prior knowledge of RADIUS, and will go into some
detail on the operation of ARAP before entering a detailed discussion
of the proposed ARAP RADIUS attributes.
There are two features of ARAP this document does not address:
1. User initiated password changing. This is not part of RADIUS,
but can be implemented through a software process other than
RADIUS.
2. Out-of-Band messages. At any time, the NAS can send messages to
an ARA client which appear in a dialog box on the dial-in
user's screen. These are not part of authentication and do not
belong here. However, we note that a Reply-Message attribute in
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an Access-Accept may be sent down to the user as a sign-on
message of the day string using the out-of-band channel.
We have tried to respect the spirit of the existing RADIUS protocol
as much as possible, making design decisions compatible with prior
art. Further, we have tried to strike a balance between flooding the
RADIUS world with new attributes, and hiding all of ARAP operation
within a single multiplexed ARAP attribute string or within Extended
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [3] machinery.
However, we feel ARAP is enough of a departure from PPP to warrant a
small set of similarly named attributes of its own.
We have assumed that an ARAP-aware RADIUS server will be able to do
DES encryption and generate security module challenges. This is in
keeping with the general RADIUS goal of smart server / simple NAS.
ARAP authenticates a connection in two phases. The first is a "Two-
Way DES" random number exchange, using the user's password as a key.
We say "Two-Way" because the ARAP NAS challenges the dial-in client
to authenticate itself, and the dial-in client challenges the ARAP
NAS to authenticate itself.
Specifically, ARAP does the following:
1. The NAS sends two 32-bit random numbers to the dial-in client
in an ARAP msg_auth_challenge packet.
2. The dial-in client uses the user's password to DES encrypt the
two random numbers sent to it by the NAS. The dial-in client
then sends this result, the user's name and two 32-bit random
numbers of its own back to the NAS in an ARAP msg_auth_request
packet.
3. The NAS verifies the encrypted random numbers sent by the
dial-in client are what it expected. If so, it encrypts the
dial-in client's challenge using the password and sends it back
to the dial-in client in an ARAP msg_auth_response packet.
Note that if the dial-in client's response was wrong, meaning the
user has the wrong password, the server can initiate a retry sequence
up to the maximum amount of retries allowed by the NAS. In this case,
when the dial-in client receives the ARAP msg_auth_response packet it
will acknowledge it with an ARAP msg_auth_again packet.
After this first "DES Phase" the ARAP NAS MAY initiate a secondary
authentication phase using what Apple calls "Add-In Security
Modules." Security Modules are small pieces of code which run on
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both the client and server and are allowed to read and write
arbitrary data across the communications link to perform additional
authentication functions. Various security token vendors use this
mechanism to authenticate ARA callers.
Although ARAP allows security modules to read and write anything they
like, all existing security modules use simple challenge and response
cycles, with perhaps some overall control information. This document
assumes all existing security modules can be supported with one or
more challenge/response cycles.
To complicate RADIUS and ARAP integration, ARAP sends down some
profile information after the DES Phase and before the Security
Module phase. This means that besides the responses to challenges,
this profile information must also be present, at somewhat unusual
times. Fortunately the information is only a few pieces of numeric
data related to passwords, which this document packs into a single
new attribute.
Presenting an Access-Request to RADIUS on behalf of an ARAP
connection is straightforward. The ARAP NAS generates the random
number challenge, and then receives the dial-in client's response,
the dial-in client's challenge, and the user's name. Assuming the
user is not a guest, the following information is forwarded in an
Access-Request packet: User-Name (up to 31 characters long),
Framed-Protocol (set to 3, ARAP), ARAP-Password, and any additional
attributes desired, such as Service-Type, NAS-IP-Address, NAS-Id,
NAS-Port-Type, NAS-Port, NAS-Port-Id, Connect-Info, etc.
The Request Authenticator is a NAS-generated 16 octet random number.
The low-order 8 octets of this number are sent to the dial-in user as
the two 4 octet random numbers required in the ARAP
msg_auth_challenge packet. Octets 0-3 are the first random number and
Octets 4-7 are the second random number.
The ARAP-Password in the Access-Request contains a 16 octet random
number field, and is used to carry the dial-in user's response to the
NAS challenge and the client's own challenge to the NAS. The high-
order octets contain the dial-in user's challenge to the NAS (2 32-
bit numbers, 8 octets) and the low-order octets contain the dial-in
user's response to the NAS challenge (2 32-bit numbers, 8 octets).
Only one of User-Password, CHAP-Password, or ARAP-Password needs to
be present in an Access-Request, or one or more EAP-Messages.
If the RADIUS server does not support ARAP it SHOULD return an
Access-Reject to the NAS.
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If the RADIUS server does support ARAP, it should verify the user's
response using the Challenge (from the lower order 8 octets of the
Request Authenticator) and the user's response (from the low order 8
octets of the ARAP-Password).
If that authentication fails, the RADIUS server should return an
Access-Reject packet to the NAS, with optional Password-Retry and
Reply-Messages attributes. The presence of Password-Retry indicates
the ARAP NAS MAY choose to initiate another challenge-response cycle,
up to a total number of times equal to the integer value of the
Password-Retry attribute.
If the user is authenticated, the RADIUS server should return an
Access-Accept packet (Code 2) to the NAS, with ID and Response
Authenticator as usual, and attributes as follows:
Service-Type of Framed-Protocol.
Framed-Protocol of ARAP (3).
Session-Timeout with the maximum connect time for the user in
seconds. If the user is to be given unlimited time,
Session-Timeout should not be included in the Access-Accept
packet, and ARAP will treat that as an unlimited timeout (-1).
ARAP-Challenge-Response, containing 8 octets with the response to
the dial-in client's challenge. The RADIUS server calculates this
value by taking the dial-in client's challenge from the high order
8 octets of the ARAP-Password attribute and performing DES
encryption on this value with the authenticating user's password
as the key. If the user's password is less than 8 octets in
length, the password is padded at the end with NULL octets to a
length of 8 before using it as a key. If the user's password is
greater than 8 octets in length, an Access-Reject MUST be sent
instead.
ARAP-Features, containing information that the NAS should send to
the user in an ARAP "feature flags" packet.
Octet 0: If zero, user cannot change their password. If non-
zero user can. (RADIUS does not handle the password changing,
just the attribute which indicates whether ARAP indicates they
can.)
Octet 1: Minimum acceptable password length (0-8).
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Octet 2-5: Password creation date in Macintosh format, defined
as 32 bits unsigned representing seconds since Midnight GMT
January 1, 1904.
Octet 6-9 Password Expiration Delta from create date in
seconds.
Octet 10-13: Current RADIUS time in Macintosh format
Optionally, a single Reply-Message with a text string up to 253
characters long which MAY be sent down to the user to be displayed
in a sign-on/message of the day dialog.
Framed-AppleTalk-Network may be included.
Framed-AppleTalk-Zone, up to 32 characters in length, may be
included.
ARAP defines the notion of a list of zones for a user. Along with
a list of zone names, a Zone Access Flag is defined (and used by
the NAS) which says how to use the list of zone names. That is,
the dial-in user may only be allowed to see the Default Zone, or
only the zones in the zone list (inclusive) or any zone except
those in the zone list (exclusive).
The ARAP NAS handles this by having a named filter which contains
(at least) zone names. This solves the problem where a single
RADIUS server is managing disparate NAS clients who may not be
able to "see" all of the zone names in a user zone list. Zone
names only have meaning "at the NAS." The disadvantage of this
approach is that zone filters must be set up on the NAS somehow,
then referenced by the RADIUS Filter-Id.
ARAP-Zone-Access contains an integer which specifies how the "zone
list" for this user should be used. If this attribute is present
and the value is 2 or 4 then a Filter-Id must also be present to
name a zone list filter to apply the access flag to.
The inclusion of a Callback-Number or Callback-Id attribute in the
Access-Accept MAY cause the ARAP NAS to disconnect after sending
the Feature Flags to begin callback processing in an ARAP specific
way.
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Other attributes may be present in the Access-Accept packet as well.
An ARAP NAS will need other information to finish bringing up the
connection to the dial in client, but this information can be
provided by the ARAP NAS without any help from RADIUS, either through
configuration by SNMP, a NAS administration program, or deduced by
the AppleTalk stack in the NAS. Specifically:
1. AppearAsNet and AppearAsNode values, sent to the client to tell
it what network and node numbers it should use in its datagram
packets. AppearAsNet can be taken from the Framed-AppleTalk-
Network attribute or from the configuration or AppleTalk stack
onthe NAS.
2. The "default" zone - that is the name of the AppleTalk zone in
which the dial-in client will appear. (Or can be specified
with the Framed-AppleTalk-Zone attribute.)
3. Other very NAS specific stuff such as the name of the NAS, and
smartbuffering information. (Smartbuffering is an ARAP
mechanism for replacing common AppleTalk datagrams with small
tokens, to improve slow link performance in a few common
traffic situations.)
4. "Zone List" information for this user. The ARAP specification
defines a "zone count" field which is actually unused.
RADIUS supports ARAP Security Modules in the following manner.
After DES authentication has been completed, the RADIUS server may
instruct the ARAP NAS to run one or more security modules for the
dial-in user. Although the underlying protocol supports executing
multiple security modules in series, in practice all current
implementations only allow executing one. Through the use of
multiple Access-Challenge requests, multiple modules can be
supported, but this facility will probably never be used.
We also assume that, even though ARAP allows a free-form dialog
between security modules on each end of the point-to-point link, in
actual practice all security modules can be reduced to a simple
challenge/response cycle.
If the RADIUS server wishes to instruct the ARAP NAS to run a
security module, it should send an Access-Challenge packet to the NAS
with (optionally) the State attribute, plus the ARAP-Challenge-
Response, ARAP-Features, and two more attributes:
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ARAP-Security: a four octet security module signature, containing a
Macintosh OSType.
ARAP-Security-Data, a string to carry the actual security module
challenge and response.
When the security module finishes executing, the security module
response is passed in an ARAP-Security-Data attribute from the NAS
to the RADIUS server in a second Access-Request, also including the
State from the Access-Challenge. The authenticator field contains no
special information in this case, and this can be discerned by the
presence of the State attribute.
2.3. RADIUS Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), described in [3],
provides a standard mechanism for support of additional
authentication methods within PPP. Through the use of EAP, support
for a number of authentication schemes may be added, including smart
cards, Kerberos, Public Key, One Time Passwords, and others. In
order to provide for support of EAP within RADIUS, two new
attributes, EAP-Message and Message-Authenticator, are introduced in
this document. This section describes how these new attributes may be
used for providing EAP support within RADIUS.
In the proposed scheme, the RADIUS server is used to shuttle RADIUS-
encapsulated EAP Packets between the NAS and a backend security
server. While the conversation between the RADIUS server and the
backend security server will typically occur using a proprietary
protocol developed by the backend security server vendor, it is also
possible to use RADIUS-encapsulated EAP via the EAP-Message
attribute. This has the advantage of allowing the RADIUS server to
support EAP without the need for authentication-specific code, which
can instead reside on the backend security server.
2.3.1. Protocol Overview
The EAP conversation between the authenticating peer (dial-in user)
and the NAS begins with the negotiation of EAP within LCP. Once EAP
has been negotiated, the NAS MUST send an EAP-Request/Identity
message to the authenticating peer, unless identity is determined via
some other means such as Called-Station-Id or Calling-Station-Id.
The peer will then respond with an EAP-Response/Identity which the
the NAS will then forward to the RADIUS server in the EAP-Message
attribute of a RADIUS Access-Request packet. The RADIUS Server will
typically use the EAP-Response/Identity to determine which EAP type
is to be applied to the user.
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In order to permit non-EAP aware RADIUS proxies to forward the
Access-Request packet, if the NAS sends the EAP-Request/Identity, the
NAS MUST copy the contents of the EAP-Response/Identity into the
User-Name attribute and MUST include the EAP-Response/Identity in the
User-Name attribute in every subsequent Access-Request. NAS-Port or
NAS-Port-Id SHOULD be included in the attributes issued by the NAS in
the Access-Request packet, and either NAS-Identifier or NAS-IP-
Address MUST be included. In order to permit forwarding of the
Access-Reply by EAP-unaware proxies, if a User-Name attribute was
included in an Access-Request, the RADIUS Server MUST include the
User-Name attribute in subsequent Access-Accept packets. Without the
User-Name attribute, accounting and billing becomes very difficult to
manage.
If identity is determined via another means such as Called-Station-Id
or Calling-Station-Id, the NAS MUST include these identifying
attributes in every Access-Request.
While this approach will save a round-trip, it cannot be universally
employed. There are circumstances in which the user's identity may
not be needed (such as when authentication and accounting is handled
based on Called-Station-Id or Calling-Station-Id), and therefore an
EAP-Request/Identity packet may not necessarily be issued by the NAS
to the authenticating peer. In cases where an EAP-Request/Identity
packet will not be sent, the NAS will send to the RADIUS server a
RADIUS Access-Request packet containing an EAP-Message attribute
signifying EAP-Start. EAP-Start is indicated by sending an EAP-
Message attribute with a length of 2 (no data). However, it should be
noted that since no User-Name attribute is included in the Access-
Request, this approach is not compatible with RADIUS as specified in
[1], nor can it easily be applied in situations where proxies are
deployed, such as roaming or shared use networks.
If the RADIUS server supports EAP, it MUST respond with an Access-
Challenge packet containing an EAP-Message attribute. If the RADIUS
server does not support EAP, it MUST respond with an Access-Reject.
The EAP-Message attribute includes an encapsulated EAP packet which
is then passed on to the authenticating peer. In the case where the
NAS does not initially send an EAP-Request/Identity message to the
peer, the Access-Challenge typically will contain an EAP-Message
attribute encapsulating an EAP-Request/Identity message, requesting
the dial-in user to identify themself. The NAS will then respond with
a RADIUS Access-Request packet containing an EAP-Message attribute
encapsulating an EAP-Response. The conversation continues until
either a RADIUS Access-Reject or Access-Accept packet is received.
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Reception of a RADIUS Access-Reject packet, with or without an EAP-
Message attribute encapsulating EAP-Failure, MUST result in the NAS
issuing an LCP Terminate Request to the authenticating peer. A
RADIUS Access-Accept packet with an EAP-Message attribute
encapsulating EAP-Success successfully ends the authentication phase.
The RADIUS Access-Accept/EAP-Message/EAP-Success packet MUST contain
all of the expected attributes which are currently returned in an
Access-Accept packet.
The above scenario creates a situation in which the NAS never needs
to manipulate an EAP packet. An alternative may be used in
situations where an EAP-Request/Identity message will always be sent
by the NAS to the authenticating peer.
For proxied RADIUS requests there are two methods of processing. If
the domain is determined based on the Called-Station-Id, the RADIUS
Server may proxy the initial RADIUS Access-Request/EAP-Start. If the
domain is determined based on the user's identity, the local RADIUS
Server MUST respond with a RADIUS Access-Challenge/EAP-Identity
packet. The response from the authenticating peer MUST be proxied to
the final authentication server.
For proxied RADIUS requests, the NAS may receive an Access-Reject
packet in response to its Access-Request/EAP-Identity packet. This
would occur if the message was proxied to a RADIUS Server which does
not support the EAP-Message extension. On receiving an Access-Reject,
the NAS MUST send an LCP Terminate Request to the authenticating
peer, and disconnect.
2.3.2. Retransmission
As noted in [3], the EAP authenticator (NAS) is responsible for
retransmission of packets between the authenticating peer and the
NAS. Thus if an EAP packet is lost in transit between the
authenticating peer and the NAS (or vice versa), the NAS will
retransmit. As in RADIUS [1], the RADIUS client is responsible for
retransmission of packets between the RADIUS client and the RADIUS
server.
Note that it may be necessary to adjust retransmission strategies and
authentication timeouts in certain cases. For example, when a token
card is used additional time may be required to allow the user to
find the card and enter the token. Since the NAS will typically not
have knowledge of the required parameters, these need to be provided
by the RADIUS server. This can be accomplished by inclusion of
Session-Timeout and Password-Retry attributes within the Access-
Challenge packet.
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If Session-Timeout is present in an Access-Challenge packet that also
contains an EAP-Message, the value of the Session-Timeout provides
the NAS with the maximum number of seconds the NAS should wait for an
EAP-Response before retransmitting the EAP-Message to the dial-in
user.
2.3.3. Fragmentation
Using the EAP-Message attribute, it is possible for the RADIUS server
to encapsulate an EAP packet that is larger than the MTU on the link
between the NAS and the peer. Since it is not possible for the RADIUS
server to use MTU discovery to ascertain the link MTU, the Framed-MTU
attribute may be included in an Access-Request packet containing an
EAP-Message attribute so as to provide the RADIUS server with this
information.
2.3.4. Examples
The example below shows the conversation between the authenticating
peer, NAS, and RADIUS server, for the case of a One Time Password
(OTP) authentication. OTP is used only for illustrative purposes;
other authentication protocols could also have been used, although
they might show somewhat different behavior.
Authenticating Peer NAS RADIUS Server
------------------- --- -------------
<- PPP LCP Request-EAP
auth
PPP LCP ACK-EAP
auth ->
<- PPP EAP-Request/
Identity
PPP EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/
EAP-Response/
(MyID) ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Challenge/
EAP-Message/EAP-Request
OTP/OTP Challenge
<- PPP EAP-Request/
OTP/OTP Challenge
PPP EAP-Response/
OTP, OTPpw ->
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RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/
EAP-Response/
OTP, OTPpw ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Accept/
EAP-Message/EAP-Success
(other attributes)
<- PPP EAP-Success
PPP Authentication
Phase complete,
NCP Phase starts
In the case where the NAS first sends an EAP-Start packet to the
RADIUS server, the conversation would appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer NAS RADIUS Server
------------------- --- -------------
<- PPP LCP Request-EAP
auth
PPP LCP ACK-EAP
auth ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/Start ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Challenge/
EAP-Message/Identity
<- PPP EA-Request/
Identity
PPP EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/
EAP-Response/
(MyID) ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Challenge/
EAP-Message/EAP-Request
OTP/OTP Challenge
<- PPP EAP-Request/
OTP/OTP Challenge
PPP EAP-Response/
OTP, OTPpw ->
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/
EAP-Response/
OTP, OTPpw ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Accept/
EAP-Message/EAP-Success
(other attributes)
<- PPP EAP-Success
PPP Authentication
Phase complete,
NCP Phase starts
In the case where the client fails EAP authentication, the
conversation would appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer NAS RADIUS Server
------------------- --- -------------
<- PPP LCP Request-EAP
auth
PPP LCP ACK-EAP
auth ->
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/Start ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Challenge/
EAP-Message/Identity
<- PPP EAP-Request/
Identity
PPP EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/
EAP-Response/
(MyID) ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Challenge/
EAP-Message/EAP-Request
OTP/OTP Challenge
<- PPP EAP-Request/
OTP/OTP Challenge
PPP EAP-Response/
OTP, OTPpw ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
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EAP-Message/
EAP-Response/
OTP, OTPpw ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Reject/
EAP-Message/EAP-Failure
<- PPP EAP-Failure
(client disconnected)
In the case that the RADIUS server or proxy does not support
EAP-Message, the conversation would appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer NAS RADIUS Server
------------------- --- -------------
<- PPP LCP Request-EAP
auth
PPP LCP ACK-EAP
auth ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/Start ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Reject
<- PPP LCP Terminate
(User Disconnected)
In the case where the local RADIUS Server does support EAP-Message,
but the remote RADIUS Server does not, the conversation would appear
as follows:
Authenticating Peer NAS RADIUS Server
------------------- --- -------------
<- PPP LCP Request-EAP
auth
PPP LCP ACK-EAP
auth ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/Start ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Challenge/
EAP-Message/Identity
<- PPP EAP-Request/
Identity
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PPP EAP-Response/
Identity
(MyID) ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
EAP-Message/EAP-Response/
(MyID) ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Reject
(proxied from remote
RADIUS Server)
<- PPP LCP Terminate
(User Disconnected)
In the case where the authenticating peer does not support EAP, but
where EAP is required for that user, the conversation would appear as
follows:
Authenticating Peer NAS RADIUS Server
------------------- --- -------------
<- PPP LCP Request-EAP
auth
PPP LCP NAK-EAP
auth ->
<- PPP LCP Request-CHAP
auth
PPP LCP ACK-CHAP
auth ->
<- PPP CHAP Challenge
PPP CHAP Response ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
User-Name,
CHAP-Password ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Reject
<- PPP LCP Terminate
(User Disconnected)
In the case where the NAS does not support EAP, but where EAP is
required for that user, the conversation would appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer NAS RADIUS Server
------------------- --- -------------
<- PPP LCP Request-CHAP
auth
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
PP LCP ACK-CHAP
auth ->
<- PPP CHAP Challenge
PPP CHAP Response ->
RADIUS
Access-Request/
User-Name,
CHAP-Password ->
<- RADIUS
Access-Reject
<- PPP LCP Terminate
(User Disconnected)
2.3.5. Alternative uses
Currently the conversation between the backend security server and
the RADIUS server is proprietary because of lack of standardization.
In order to increase standardization and provide interoperability
between Radius vendors and backend security vendors, it is
recommended that RADIUS-encapsulated EAP be used for this
conversation.
This has the advantage of allowing the RADIUS server to support EAP
without the need for authentication-specific code within the RADIUS
server. Authentication-specific code can then reside on a backend
security server instead.
In the case where RADIUS-encapsulated EAP is used in a conversation
between a RADIUS server and a backend security server, the security
server will typically return an Access-Accept/EAP-Success message
without inclusion of the expected attributes currently returned in an
Access-Accept. This means that the RADIUS server MUST add these
attributes prior to sending an Access-Accept/EAP-Success message to
the NAS.
3. Packet Format
Packet Format is identical to that defined in RFC 2865 [1] and 2866
[2].
4. Packet Types
Packet types are identical to those defined in RFC 2865 [1] and 2866
[2].
See "Table of Attributes" below to determine which types of packets
can contain which attributes defined here.
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5. Attributes
RADIUS Attributes carry the specific authentication, authorization
and accounting details for the request and response.
Some attributes MAY be included more than once. The effect of this
is attribute specific, and is specified in each attribute
description. The order of attributes of the same type SHOULD be
preserved. The order of attributes of different types is not
required to be preserved.
The end of the list of attributes is indicated by the Length of the
RADIUS packet.
A summary of the attribute format is the same as in RFC 2865 [1] but
is included here for ease of reference. The fields are transmitted
from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
The Type field is one octet. Up-to-date values of the RADIUS Type
field are specified in the most recent "Assigned Numbers" RFC [5].
Values 192-223 are reserved for experimental use, values 224-240
are reserved for implementation-specific use, and values 241-255
are reserved and should not be used. This specification concerns
the following values:
1-39 (refer to RFC 2865 [1], "RADIUS")
40-51 (refer to RFC 2866 [2], "RADIUS Accounting")
52 Acct-Input-Gigawords
53 Acct-Output-Gigawords
54 Unused
55 Event-Timestamp
56-59 Unused
60-63 (refer to RFC 2865 [1], "RADIUS")
64-67 (refer to [6])
68 (refer to [7])
69 (refer to [6])
70 ARAP-Password
71 ARAP-Features
72 ARAP-Zone-Access
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73 ARAP-Security
74 ARAP-Security-Data
75 Password-Retry
76 Prompt
77 Connect-Info
78 Configuration-Token
79 EAP-Message
80 Message-Authenticator
81-83 (refer to [6])
84 ARAP-Challenge-Response
85 Acct-Interim-Interval
86 (refer to [7])
87 NAS-Port-Id
88 Framed-Pool
89 Unused
90-91 (refer to [6])
92-191 Unused
Length
The Length field is one octet, and indicates the length of this
attribute including the Type, Length and Value fields. If an
attribute is received in a packet with an invalid Length, the
entire request should be silently discarded.
Value
The Value field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the attribute. The format and length of the Value
field is determined by the Type and Length fields.
Note that none of the types in RADIUS terminate with a NUL (hex
00). In particular, types "text" and "string" in RADIUS do not
terminate with a NUL (hex 00). The Attribute has a length field
and does not use a terminator. Text contains UTF-8 encoded 10646
[8] characters and String contains 8-bit binary data. Servers and
servers and clients MUST be able to deal with embedded nulls.
RADIUS implementers using C are cautioned not to use strcpy() when
handling strings.
The format of the value field is one of five data types. Note
that type "text" is a subset of type "string."
text 1-253 octets containing UTF-8 encoded 10646 [8]
characters. Text of length zero (0) MUST NOT be sent;
omit the entire attribute instead.
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
string 1-253 octets containing binary data (values 0 through
255 decimal, inclusive). Strings of length zero (0) MUST
NOT be sent; omit the entire attribute instead.
address 32 bit unsigned value, most significant octet first.
integer 32 bit unsigned value, most significant octet first.
time 32 bit unsigned value, most significant octet first --
seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, January 1, 1970.
5.1. Acct-Input-Gigawords
Description
This attribute indicates how many times the Acct-Input-Octets
counter has wrapped around 2^32 over the course of this service
being provided, and can only be present in Accounting-Request
records where the Acct-Status-Type is set to Stop or Interim-
Update.
A summary of the Acct-Input-Gigawords attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
52 for Acct-Input-Gigawords.
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets.
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5.2. Acct-Output-Gigawords
Description
This attribute indicates how many times the Acct-Output-Octets
counter has wrapped around 2^32 in the course of delivering this
service, and can only be present in Accounting-Request records
where the Acct-Status-Type is set to Stop or Interim-Update.
A summary of the Acct-Output-Gigawords attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
53 for Acct-Output-Gigawords.
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets.
5.3. Event-Timestamp
Description
This attribute is included in an Accounting-Request packet to
record the time that this event occurred on the NAS, in seconds
since January 1, 1970 00:00 UTC.
A summary of the Event-Timestamp attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
55 for Event-Timestamp
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets encoding an unsigned integer with
the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00 UTC.
5.4. ARAP-Password
Description
This attribute is only present in an Access-Request packet
containing a Framed-Protocol of ARAP.
Only one of User-Password, CHAP-Password, or ARAP-Password needs
to be present in an Access-Request, or one or more EAP-Messages.
A summary of the ARAP-Password attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value2
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value4
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Type
70 for ARAP-Password.
Length
18
Value
This attribute contains a 16 octet string, used to carry the
dial-in user's response to the NAS challenge and the client's own
challenge to the NAS. The high-order octets (Value1 and Value2)
contain the dial-in user's challenge to the NAS (2 32-bit numbers,
8 octets) and the low-order octets (Value3 and Value4) contain the
dial-in user's response to the NAS challenge (2 32-bit numbers, 8
octets).
5.5. ARAP-Features
Description
This attribute is sent in an Access-Accept packet with Framed-
Protocol of ARAP, and includes password information that the NAS
should sent to the user in an ARAP "feature flags" packet.
A summary of the ARAP-Features attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value1 | Value2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value3 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value5 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
71 for ARAP-Features.
Length
16
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Value
The Value field is a compound string containing information the
NAS should send to the user in the ARAP "feature flags" packet.
Value1: If zero, user cannot change their password. If non-zero
user can. (RADIUS does not handle the password changing, just
the attribute which indicates whether ARAP indicates they can.)
Value2: Minimum acceptable password length, from 0 to 8.
Value3: Password creation date in Macintosh format, defined as
32 unsigned bits representing seconds since Midnight GMT
January 1, 1904.
Value4: Password Expiration Delta from create date in seconds.
Value5: Current RADIUS time in Macintosh format.
5.6. ARAP-Zone-Access
Description
This attribute is included in an Access-Accept packet with
Framed-Protocol of ARAP to indicate how the ARAP zone list for the
user should be used.
A summary of the ARAP-Zone-Access attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
72 for ARAP-Zone-Access.
Length
6
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
Value
The Value field is four octets encoding an integer with one of the
following values:
1 Only allow access to default zone
2 Use zone filter inclusively
4 Use zone filter exclusively
The value 3 is skipped, not because these are bit flags, but
because 3 in some ARAP implementations means "all zones" which is
the same as not specifying a list at all under RADIUS.
If this attribute is present and the value is 2 or 4 then a
Filter-Id must also be present to name a zone list filter to apply
the access flag to.
5.7. ARAP-Security
Description
This attribute identifies the ARAP Security Module to be used in
an Access-Challenge packet.
A summary of the ARAP-Security attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
73 for ARAP-Security.
Length
6
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing an integer specifying
the security module signature, which is a Macintosh OSType.
(Macintosh OSTypes are 4 ascii characters cast as a 32-bit
integer)
5.8. ARAP-Security-Data
Description
This attribute contains the actual security module challenge or
response, and can be found in Access-Challenge and Access-Request
packets.
A summary of the ARAP-Security-Data attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
74 for ARAP-Security-Data.
Length
>=3
String
The String field contains the security module challenge or
response associated with the ARAP Security Module specified in
ARAP-Security.
5.9. Password-Retry
Description
This attribute MAY be included in an Access-Reject to indicate how
many authentication attempts a user may be allowed to attempt
before being disconnected.
It is primarily intended for use with ARAP authentication.
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
A summary of the Password-Retry attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
75 for Password-Retry.
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing an integer specifying
the number of password retry attempts to permit the user.
5.10. Prompt
Description
This attribute is used only in Access-Challenge packets, and
indicates to the NAS whether it should echo the user's response as
it is entered, or not echo it.
A summary of the Prompt attribute format is shown below. The fields
are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
76 for Prompt.
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RFC 2869 RADIUS Extensions June 2000
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets.
0 No Echo
1 Echo
5.11. Connect-Info
Description
This attribute is sent from the NAS to indicate the nature of the
user's connection.
The NAS MAY send this attribute in an Access-Request or
Accounting-Request to indicate the nature of the user's
connection.
A summary of the Connect-Info attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Text...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
77 for Connect-Info.
Length
>= 3
Text
The Text field consists of UTF-8 encoded 10646 [8] characters.
The connection speed SHOULD be included at the beginning of the
first Connect-Info attribute in the packet. If the transmit and
receive connection speeds differ, they may both be included in the
first attribute with the transmit speed first (the speed the NAS
modem transmits at), a slash (/), the receive speed, then
optionally other information.
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For example, "28800 V42BIS/LAPM" or "52000/31200 V90"
More than one Connect-Info attribute may be present in an
Accounting-Request packet to accommodate expected efforts by ITU
to have modems report more connection information in a standard
format that might exceed 252 octets.
5.12. Configuration-Token
Description
This attribute is for use in large distributed authentication
networks based on proxy. It is sent from a RADIUS Proxy Server to
a RADIUS Proxy Client in an Access-Accept to indicate a type of
user profile to be used. It should not be sent to a NAS.
A summary of the Configuration-Token attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
78 for Configuration-Token.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets. The actual format of the
information is site or application specific, and a robust
implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.
The codification of the range of allowed usage of this field is
outside the scope of this specification.
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5.13. EAP-Message
Description
This attribute encapsulates Extended Access Protocol [3] packets
so as to allow the NAS to authenticate dial-in users via EAP
without having to understand the EAP protocol.
The NAS places any EAP messages received from the user into one or
more EAP attributes and forwards them to the RADIUS Server as part
of the Access-Request, which can return EAP messages in Access-
Challenge, Access-Accept and Access-Reject packets.
A RADIUS Server receiving EAP messages that it does not understand
SHOULD return an Access-Reject.
The NAS places EAP messages received from the authenticating peer
into one or more EAP-Message attributes and forwards them to the
RADIUS Server within an Access-Request message. If multiple EAP-
Messages are contained within an Access-Request or Access-
Challenge packet, they MUST be in order and they MUST be
consecutive attributes in the Access-Request or Access-Challenge
packet. Access-Accept and Access-Reject packets SHOULD only have
ONE EAP-Message attribute in them, containing EAP-Success or EAP-
Failure.
It is expected that EAP will be used to implement a variety of
authentication methods, including methods involving strong
cryptography. In order to prevent attackers from subverting EAP by
attacking RADIUS/EAP, (for example, by modifying the EAP-Success
or EAP-Failure packets) it is necessary that RADIUS/EAP provide
integrity protection at least as strong as those used in the EAP
methods themselves.
Therefore the Message-Authenticator attribute MUST be used to
protect all Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, and
Access-Reject packets containing an EAP-Message attribute.
Access-Request packets including an EAP-Message attribute without
a Message-Authenticator attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by
the RADIUS server. A RADIUS Server supporting EAP-Message MUST
calculate the correct value of the Message-Authenticator and
silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.
A RADIUS Server not supporting EAP-Message MUST return an Access-
Reject if it receives an Access-Request containing an EAP-Message
attribute. A RADIUS Server receiving an EAP-Message attribute that
it does not understand MUST return an Access-Reject.
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Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, or Access-Reject packets
including an EAP-Message attribute without a Message-Authenticator
attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by the NAS. A NAS
supporting EAP-Message MUST calculate the correct value of the
Message-Authenticator and silently discard the packet if it does
not match the value sent.
A summary of the EAP-Message attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
79 for EAP-Message.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field contains EAP packets, as defined in [3]. If
multiple EAP-Message attributes are present in a packet their
values should be concatenated; this allows EAP packets longer than
253 octets to be passed by RADIUS.
5.14. Message-Authenticator
Description
This attribute MAY be used to sign Access-Requests to prevent
spoofing Access-Requests using CHAP, ARAP or EAP authentication
methods. It MAY be used in any Access-Request. It MUST be used
in any Access-Request, Access-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-
Challenge that includes an EAP-Message attribute.
A RADIUS Server receiving an Access-Request with a Message-
Authenticator Attribute present MUST calculate the correct value
of the Message-Authenticator and silently discard the packet if it
does not match the value sent.
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A RADIUS Client receiving an Access-Accept, Access-Reject or
Access-Challenge with a Message-Authenticator Attribute present
MUST calculate the correct value of the Message-Authenticator and
silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.
Earlier drafts of this memo used "Signature" as the name of this
attribute, but Message-Authenticator is more precise. Its
operation has not changed, just the name.
A summary of the Message-Authenticator attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
80 for Message-Authenticator
Length
18
String
When present in an Access-Request packet, Message-Authenticator is
an HMAC-MD5 [9] checksum of the entire Access-Request packet,
including Type, ID, Length and authenticator, using the shared
secret as the key, as follows.
Message-Authenticator = HMAC-MD5 (Type, Identifier, Length,
Request Authenticator, Attributes)
When the checksum is calculated the signature string should be
considered to be sixteen octets of zero.
For Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, and Access-Reject packets,
the Message-Authenticator is calculated as follows, using the
Request-Authenticator from the Access-Request this packet is in
reply to:
Message-Authenticator = HMAC-MD5 (Type, Identifier, Length,
Request Authenticator, Attributes)
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When the checksum is calculated the signature string should be
considered to be sixteen octets of zero. The shared secret is
used as the key for the HMAC-MD5 hash. The is calculated and
inserted in the packet before the Response Authenticator is
calculated.
This attribute is not needed if the User-Password attribute is
present, but is useful for preventing attacks on other types of
authentication. This attribute is intended to thwart attempts by
an attacker to setup a "rogue" NAS, and perform online dictionary
attacks against the RADIUS server. It does not afford protection
against "offline" attacks where the attacker intercepts packets
containing (for example) CHAP challenge and response, and performs
a dictionary attack against those packets offline.
IP Security will eventually make this attribute unnecessary, so it
should be considered an interim measure.
5.15. ARAP-Challenge-Response
Description
This attribute is sent in an Access-Accept packet with Framed-
Protocol of ARAP, and contains the response to the dial-in
client's challenge.
A summary of the ARAP-Challenge-Response attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
84 for ARAP-Challenge-Response.
Length
10
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Value
The Value field contains an 8 octet response to the dial-in
client's challenge. The RADIUS server calculates this value by
taking the dial-in client's challenge from the high order 8 octets
of the ARAP-Password attribute and performing DES encryption on
this value with the authenticating user's password as the key. If
the user's password is less than 8 octets in length, the password
is padded at the end with NULL octets to a length of 8 before
using it as a key.
5.16. Acct-Interim-Interval
Description
This attribute indicates the number of seconds between each
interim update in seconds for this specific session. This value
can only appear in the Access-Accept message.
A summary of the Acct-Interim-Interval attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
85 for Acct-Interim-Interval.
Length
6
Value
The Value field contains the number of seconds between each
interim update to be sent from the NAS for this session. The value
MUST NOT be smaller than 60. The value SHOULD NOT be smaller than
600, and careful consideration should be given to its impact on
network traffic.
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5.17. NAS-Port-Id
Description
This Attribute contains a text string which identifies the port of
the NAS which is authenticating the user. It is only used in
Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets. Note that this is
using "port" in its sense of a physical connection on the NAS, not
in the sense of a TCP or UDP port number.
Either NAS-Port or NAS-Port-Id SHOULD be present in an Access-
Request packet, if the NAS differentiates among its ports. NAS-
Port-Id is intended for use by NASes which cannot conveniently
number their ports.
A summary of the NAS-Port-Id Attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Text...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
87 for NAS-Port-Id.
Length
>= 3
Text
The Text field contains the name of the port using UTF-8 encoded
10646 [8] characters.
5.18. Framed-Pool
Description
This Attribute contains the name of an assigned address pool that
SHOULD be used to assign an address for the user. If a NAS does
not support multiple address pools, the NAS should ignore this
Attribute. Address pools are usually used for IP addresses, but
can be used for other protocols if the NAS supports pools for
those protocols.
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A summary of the Framed-Pool Attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
88 for Framed-Pool
Length
>= 3
String
The string field contains the name of an assigned address pool
configured on the NAS.
5.19. Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
in which kind of packets. Acct-Input-Gigawords, Acct-Output-
Gigawords, Event-Timestamp, and NAS-Port-Id may have 0-1 instances in
an Accounting-Request packet. Connect-Info may have 0+ instances in
an Accounting-Request packet. The other attributes added in this
document must not be present in an Accounting-Request.
Request Accept Reject Challenge # Attribute
0-1 0 0 0 70 ARAP-Password [Note 1]
0 0-1 0 0-1 71 ARAP-Features
0 0-1 0 0 72 ARAP-Zone-Access
0-1 0 0 0-1 73 ARAP-Security
0+ 0 0 0+ 74 ARAP-Security-Data
0 0 0-1 0 75 Password-Retry
0 0 0 0-1 76 Prompt
0-1 0 0 0 77 Connect-Info
0 0+ 0 0 78 Configuration-Token
0+ 0+ 0+ 0+ 79 EAP-Message [Note 1]
0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 80 Message-Authenticator [Note 1]
0 0-1 0 0-1 84 ARAP-Challenge-Response
0 0-1 0 0 85 Acct-Interim-Interval
0-1 0 0 0 87 NAS-Port-Id
0 0-1 0 0 88 Framed-Pool
Request Accept Reject Challenge # Attribute
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[Note 1] An Access-Request that contains either a User-Password or
CHAP-Password or ARAP-Password or one or more EAP-Message attributes
MUST NOT contain more than one type of those four attributes. If it
does not contain any of those four attributes, it SHOULD contain a
Message-Authenticator. If any packet type contains an EAP-Message
attribute it MUST also contain a Message-Authenticator.
The following table defines the above table entries.
0 This attribute MUST NOT be present
0+ Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be present.
0-1 Zero or one instance of this attribute MAY be present.
1 Exactly one instance of this attribute MUST be present.
6. IANA Considerations
The Packet Type Codes, Attribute Types, and Attribute Values defined
in this document are registered by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in the
"IANA Considerations" section of [1], in accordance with BCP 26 [10].
7. Security Considerations
The attributes other than Message-Authenticator and EAP-Message in
this document have no additional security considerations beyond those
already identified in [1].
7.1. Message-Authenticator Security
Access-Request packets with a User-Password establish the identity of
both the user and the NAS sending the Access-Request, because of the
way the shared secret between NAS and RADIUS server is used.
Access-Request packets with CHAP-Password or EAP-Message do not have
a User-Password attribute, so the Message-Authenticator attribute
should be used in access-request packets that do not have a User-
Password, in order to establish the identity of the NAS sending the
request.
7.2. EAP Security
Since the purpose of EAP is to provide enhanced security for PPP
authentication, it is critical that RADIUS support for EAP be secure.
In particular, the following issues must be addressed:
Separation of EAP server and PPP authenticator
Connection hijacking
Man in the middle attacks
Multiple databases
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Negotiation attacks
7.2.1. Separation of EAP server and PPP authenticator
It is possible for the EAP endpoints to mutually authenticate,
negotiate a ciphersuite, and derive a session key for subsequent use
in PPP encryption.
This does not present an issue on the peer, since the peer and EAP
client reside on the same machine; all that is required is for the
EAP client module to pass the session key to the PPP encryption
module.
The situation is more complex when EAP is used with RADIUS, since the
PPP authenticator will typically not reside on the same machine as
the EAP server. For example, the EAP server may be a backend security
server, or a module residing on the RADIUS server.
In the case where the EAP server and PPP authenticator reside on
different machines, there are several implications for security.
Firstly, mutual authentication will occur between the peer and the
EAP server, not between the peer and the authenticator. This means
that it is not possible for the peer to validate the identity of the
NAS or tunnel server that it is speaking to.
As described earlier, when EAP/RADIUS is used to encapsulate EAP
packets, the Message-Authenticator attribute is required in
EAP/RADIUS Access-Requests sent from the NAS or tunnel server to the
RADIUS server. Since the Message-Authenticator attribute involves a
HMAC-MD5 hash, it is possible for the RADIUS server to verify the
integrity of the Access-Request as well as the NAS or tunnel server's
identity. Similarly, Access-Challenge packets sent from the RADIUS
server to the NAS are also authenticated and integrity protected
using an HMAC-MD5 hash, enabling the NAS or tunnel server to
determine the integrity of the packet and verify the identity of the
RADIUS server. Moreover, EAP packets sent via methods that contain
their own integrity protection cannot be successfully modified by a
rogue NAS or tunnel server.
The second issue that arises in the case of an EAP server and PPP
authenticator residing on different machines is that the session key
negotiated between the peer and EAP server will need to be
transmitted to the authenticator. Therefore a mechanism needs to be
provided to transmit the session key from the EAP server to the
authenticator or tunnel server that needs to use the key. The
specification of this transit mechanism is outside the scope of this
document.
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7.2.2. Connection hijacking
In this form of attack, the attacker attempts to inject packets into
the conversation between the NAS and the RADIUS server, or between
the RADIUS server and the backend security server. RADIUS does not
support encryption, and as described in [1], only Access-Reply and
Access-Challenge packets are integrity protected. Moreover, the
integrity protection mechanism described in [1] is weaker than that
likely to be used by some EAP methods, making it possible to subvert
those methods by attacking EAP/RADIUS.
In order to provide for authentication of all packets in the EAP
exchange, all EAP/RADIUS packets MUST be authenticated using the
Message-Authenticator attribute, as described previously.
7.2.3. Man in the middle attacks
Since RADIUS security is based on shared secrets, end-to-end security
is not provided in the case where authentication or accounting
packets are forwarded along a proxy chain. As a result, attackers
gaining control of a RADIUS proxy will be able to modify EAP packets
in transit.
7.2.4. Multiple databases
In many cases a backend security server will be deployed along with a
RADIUS server in order to provide EAP services. Unless the backend
security server also functions as a RADIUS server, two separate user
databases will exist, each containing information about the security
requirements for the user. This represents a weakness, since security
may be compromised by a successful attack on either of the servers,
or their backend databases. With multiple user databases, adding a
new user may require multiple operations, increasing the chances for
error. The problems are further magnified in the case where user
information is also being kept in an LDAP server. In this case, three
stores of user information may exist.
In order to address these threats, consolidation of databases is
recommended. This can be achieved by having both the RADIUS server
and backend security server store information in the same backend
database; by having the backend security server provide a full RADIUS
implementation; or by consolidating both the backend security server
and the RADIUS server onto the same machine.
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7.2.5. Negotiation attacks
In a negotiation attack, a rogue NAS, tunnel server, RADIUS proxy or
RADIUS server causes the authenticating peer to choose a less secure
authentication method so as to make it easier to obtain the user's
password. For example, a session that would normally be authenticated
with EAP would instead authenticated via CHAP or PAP; alternatively,
a connection that would normally be authenticated via one EAP type
occurs via a less secure EAP type, such as MD5. The threat posed by
rogue devices, once thought to be remote, has gained currency given
compromises of telephone company switching systems, such as those
described in [11].
Protection against negotiation attacks requires the elimination of
downward negotiations. This can be achieved via implementation of
per-connection policy on the part of the authenticating peer, and
per-user policy on the part of the RADIUS server.
For the authenticating peer, authentication policy should be set on a
per-connection basis. Per-connection policy allows an authenticating
peer to negotiate EAP when calling one service, while negotiating
CHAP for another service, even if both services are accessible via
the same phone number.
With per-connection policy, an authenticating peer will only attempt
to negotiate EAP for a session in which EAP support is expected. As a
result, there is a presumption that an authenticating peer selecting
EAP requires that level of security. If it cannot be provided, it is
likely that there is some kind of misconfiguration, or even that the
authenticating peer is contacting the wrong server. Should the NAS
not be able to negotiate EAP, or should the EAP-Request sent by the
NAS be of a different EAP type than what is expected, the
authenticating peer MUST disconnect. An authenticating peer expecting
EAP to be negotiated for a session MUST NOT negotiate CHAP or PAP.
For a NAS, it may not be possible to determine whether a user is
required to authenticate with EAP until the user's identity is known.
For example, for shared-uses NASes it is possible for one reseller to
implement EAP while another does not. In such cases, if any users of
the NAS MUST do EAP, then the NAS MUST attempt to negotiate EAP for
every call. This avoids forcing an EAP-capable client to do more than
one authentication, which weakens security.
If CHAP is negotiated, the NAS will pass the User-Name and CHAP-
Password attributes to the RADIUS Server in an Access-Request packet.
If the user is not required to use EAP, then the RADIUS Server will
respond with an Access-Accept or Access-Reject packet as appropriate.
However, if CHAP has been negotiated but EAP is required, the RADIUS
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server MUST respond with an Access-Reject, rather than an Access-
Challenge/EAP-Message/EAP-Request packet. The authenticating peer
MUST refuse to renegotiate authentication, even if the renegotiation
is from CHAP to EAP.
If EAP is negotiated but is not supported by the RADIUS proxy or
server, then the server or proxy MUST respond with an Access-Reject.
In these cases, the NAS MUST send an LCP-Terminate and disconnect the
user. This is the correct behavior since the authenticating peer is
expecting EAP to be negotiated, and that expectation cannot be
fulfilled. An EAP-capable authenticating peer MUST refuse to
renegotiate the authentication protocol if EAP had initially been
negotiated. Note that problems with a non-EAP capable RADIUS proxy
could prove difficult to diagnose, since a user dialing in from one
location (with an EAP-capable proxy) might be able to successfully
authenticate via EAP, while the same user dialing into another
location (and encountering an EAP-incapable proxy) might be
consistently disconnected.
8. References
[1] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
2000.
[2] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[3] Blunk, L. and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.
[4] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March, 1997.
[5] Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, RFC 1700,
October 1994.
[6] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege, M. and
I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC
2868, June 2000.
[7] Zorn, G., Aboba, B. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS Accounting
Modifications for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2867, June 2000.
[8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
2279, January 1998.
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[9] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[10] Alvestrand, H. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.
[11] Slatalla, M., and Quittner, J., "Masters of Deception."
HarperCollins, New York, 1995.
9. Acknowledgements
RADIUS and RADIUS Accounting were originally developed by Livingston
Enterprises (now part of Lucent Technologies) for their PortMaster
series of Network Access Servers.
The section on ARAP is adopted with permission from "Using RADIUS to
Authenticate Apple Remote Access Connections" by Ward Willats of Cyno
Technologies (ward@cyno.com).
The section on Acct-Interim-Interval is adopted with permission from
an earlier work in progress by Pat Calhoun of Sun Microsystems, Mark
Beadles of Compuserve, and Alex Ratcliffe of UUNET Technologies.
The section on EAP is adopted with permission from an earlier work in
progress by Pat Calhoun of Sun Microsystems, Allan Rubens of Merit
Network, and Bernard Aboba of Microsoft. Thanks also to Dave Dawson
and Karl Fox of Ascend, and Glen Zorn and Narendra Gidwani of
Microsoft for useful discussions of this problem space.
10. Chair's Address
The RADIUS working group can be contacted via the current chair:
Carl Rigney
Livingston Enterprises
4464 Willow Road
Pleasanton, California 94588
Phone: +1 925 737 2100
EMail: cdr@telemancy.com
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11. Authors' Addresses
Questions about this memo can also be directed to:
Carl Rigney
Livingston Enterprises
4464 Willow Road
Pleasanton, California 94588
EMail: cdr@telemancy.com
Questions on ARAP and RADIUS may be directed to:
Ward Willats
Cyno Technologies
1082 Glen Echo Ave
San Jose, CA 95125
Phone: +1 408 297 7766
EMail: ward@cyno.com
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Questions on EAP and RADIUS may be directed to any of the following:
Pat R. Calhoun
Network and Security Research Center
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
15 Network Circle
Menlo Park, CA 94025
Phone: +1 650 786 7733
EMail: pcalhoun@eng.sun.com
Allan C. Rubens
Tut Systems, Inc.
220 E. Huron, Suite 260
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
Phone: +1 734 995 1697
EMail: arubens@tutsys.com
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: +1 425 936 6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
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12. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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RFC, FYI, BCP