Network Working Group S. Bradner
Request for Comments: 3751 Harvard U.
Category: Informational 1 April 2004
Omniscience Protocol Requirements
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
There have been a number of legislative initiatives in the U.S. and
elsewhere over the past few years to use the Internet to actively
interfere with allegedly illegal activities of Internet users. This
memo proposes a number of requirements for a new protocol, the
Omniscience Protocol, that could be used to enable such efforts.
1. Introduction
In a June 17, 2003 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, entitled
"The Dark Side of a Bright Idea: Could Personal and National Security
Risks Compromise the Potential of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing
Networks?," U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the chair of the
committee, said he was interested in the ability to destroy the
computers of people who illegally download copyrighted material. He
said this "may be the only way you can teach somebody about
copyrights." "If we can find some way to do this without destroying
their machines, we'd be interested in hearing about that," Mr Hatch
was quoted as saying during a Senate hearing. He went on to say "If
that's the only way, then I'm all for destroying their machines."
[Guardian]
Mr. Hatch was not the first U.S. elected official to propose
something along this line. A year earlier, representatives, Howard
Berman (D-Calif.) and Howard Coble (R-N.C.), introduced a bill that
would have immunized groups such as the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) from all state and federal laws if they disable, block, or
otherwise impair a "publicly accessible peer-to-peer file-trading
network."
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The attitude of some of the copyright holders may be that it's OK for
a few honest people to have their computers or networks executed as
long as the machines and networks of the dishonest are killed. But
it is not likely that any measurable error rate would be acceptable
to the public. Clearly, anyone implementing laws of this type need
some way to reduce the error rate and be sure that they are dealing
with a real bad guy and not an innocent bystander.
Part of determining if someone is a "bad guy" is determining his or
her intent. Historically, western jurisprudence has required that
prosecutors show that a person intended to commit a crime before that
person could be convicted of committing that crime. [Holdsworth,
Restatement, Prosser, United States v. Wise, Garratt v. Dailey]
Because it can be quite difficult to establish a person's intent
lawmakers have, in some cases, reduced the requirement for
prosecutors to establish intent and mere possession is now proof
enough of intent.
This memo proposes a set of requirements for a new protocol to be
used by prosecutors to determine a person's intent, thus reducing the
need to dilute the historical legal requirement to show intent and by
groups such as the MPAA and RIAA to be sure they are dealing with
lawbreakers and not 60 year old non computer users.
2. Omniscience Protocol Requirements
For the purpose of these requirements, I will assume that the OP is
implemented using a client-server model, where the OP client is
installed on the user's computer and the server is installed on a
computer run by a law or copyright enforcement organization. OP
Clients would register with all OP Servers that pertain to the legal
jurisdiction in which the client is located each time the computer is
started. OP Servers would then, on whatever schedule they have been
configured to use, send OP Queries to OP Clients to find out if the
computer operator has engaged in an illegal act of interest to the
operator of the OP Server. Future versions of the OP might operate
using a peer-to-peer model if the copyright enforcement people can
ever get over their visceral disgust at the very concept of peer-to-
peer networks.
For the purpose of this memo, I will use copyright infringement as an
example of an illegal act that the OP protocol could be used to
expose. The OP has numerous possible applications beyond ferreting
out copyright infringement. For example, the OP would be of great
assistance to instructors trying to determine if their students are
producing original work or engaging in plagiarism. The same function
would be invaluable to newspaper editors checking up on reporter's
dispatches.
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Also for the purpose of this memo, I assume that an evil-doer (also
referred to as a miscreant) is in full control of a computer and that
OP Servers will generally be operated by "Good guys." (See
Functional Requirements FR5-7 for requirements to ensure that the
latter is the case.) In the context of this memo, "evil-doer" and
"miscreant" are defined as individuals or groups of individuals who
perform acts that the operator of an OP Server has a legally
recognized right to prevent. In the context of this memo, "good
guys" refers to individuals or groups of individuals who have a
legally recognized right to prevent certain acts that computer users
may attempt to do with their computers. The use of this term is not
meant to convey any value judgment of the morality, forward thinking
nature, public spiritedness, or the monetary worth relative to most
of humanity of such individuals or groups of individuals.
2.1. Operational Requirements
OR1: The OP client must be able to install itself into all types of
computers over the objections of the computer user.
Discussion: The OP client would be installed by legal mandate in
all new computers, but since there are hundreds of millions of
existing computers, the OP client must be able to install itself
in all of these existing computers in order to afford universal
coverage of all possible miscreants. This installation must be
accomplished even if the user, many of whom have full
administrative control over their computers, tries to prevent
it.
OR2: True OP clients must not be findable by the computer user by any
means, including commercial virus detectors, but all hackers'
programs that mimic OP clients must be easily findable by
commercial virus detectors.
Discussion: Since anyone whose intent was to violate the law
would not want the OP client to be watching their action, they
would try to disable the OP client. Thus the OP Client, once
installed, should be invisible to all methods a user might
employ to discover it. Users must be able to find and remove
any virus or worm that tries to masquerade as an OP client to
escape detection.
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OR3: The OP must be able to communicate through uncooperative
firewalls, NATs, and when the computer is disconnected from the
Internet.
Discussion: Since the evil-doer may have control of a local
firewall or NAT, the OP must be able to communicate with the OP
server, even when the firewall or NAT has been configured to
block all unused ports. Also, since the evil-doer might try to
hide his or her evil-doing by disconnecting the computer from
the network, the OP must be able to continue to communicate,
even under these circumstances. Meeting this requirement may
require that the OP client be able to reconfigure the user's
machine into a cell phone or to implement GMPLS-WH [GMPLS-WH].
OR4: Neither the operation of the OP client or the OP server must be
able to be spoofed.
Discussion: The user must not be able to create their own
version of an OP client that can fool the OP server. Nor can it
be possible for someone to create their own OP server that can
be used to query OP clients.
Discussion: Because of the potential for a user to hide their
illicit activities by mimicking the operation of the OP client
on their machine, it must not be possible to do so. In the same
vein, because of the potential for violating the user's privacy,
it must not be possible for a non-authorized OP server to be
seen as authorized by OP clients. Since there will be an
arbitrary, and changing, number of OP servers, at least one for
each type of protected material, OP authentication and
authorization must be able to be accomplished with no prior
knowledge of a particular OP server by the OP client.
OR5: The OP client must be able to be installed on any portable
device that can be used to play protected material or execute
protected software.
Discussion: Since small, portable devices, such as MP3 players,
are becoming the preferred method of playing back prerecorded
music and videos, they must all include OP clients. OP clients
must be able to be automatically installed on all such existing
devices.
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2.2. Functional Requirements
FR1: The OP client must be able to determine the user's intent.
Discussion: Just knowing that the user has a copy of a protected
work on their system does not, by itself, mean that the copy is
illegal. It could easily be a copy that the user purchased.
The OP must be able to tell if a copy is an illegal copy with
complete reliability. The OP must be able to differentiate
between an original, and legal, copy and a bit-for-bit illegal
reproduction. The OP client must be able to differentiate
between copies that were created for the purpose of backup, and
are thus generally legal, and those copies created for the
purpose of illegal distribution. In the case of some types of
software, the OP client must be able to determine the intent of
the user for the software. An example of this need is related
to the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and similar
laws around the world. These laws outlaw the possession of
circumvention technology, such as crypto analysis software, in
most cases. Some exemption is made for legitimate researchers,
but without an OP it is quite hard to determine if the
circumvention technology is to be used for research or to break
copyright protections for the purpose of making illegal copies
of protected material. With the OP, the DMCA, and laws like it,
can be rewritten so that circumvention technology is legal and
developers can find out if their security protocols are any
good, something which may be illegal under current law.
FR2: The OP client must be able to remotely differentiate between
illegal material and other material with the same file name.
Discussion: A user might create a file that has the same
filename as that of a protected work. The OP must not be fooled
into thinking that the user's file is a protected one.
FR3: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the
filename has been changed.
Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected
work by just changing its name.
FR4: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the
user has modified the work in some way.
Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected
work by modifying the work, for example, by prepending,
appending, or inserting extra material, or by changing some of
the protected work. The OP must be able to make a legal
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determination that a modified work is no longer legally the same
as the original if the amount and type of modification exceed a
subjective threshold.
FR5: The OP client must not be able to be run by a hacker, and the OP
interface into a user's computer must not be able to be
exploited by a hacker.
Discussion: OP clients will be attractive targets for hackers
since they will have full access within a user's computer. The
interface between the OP client and server must be secure
against all possible hacking attacks.
FR6: The OP client must be able to discern the motives of the
operator of the OP server and not run if those motives are not
pure.
Discussion: Since it cannot be assumed that the operators of the
OP server will always have the best motives, the OP client must
be able to reject requests from the OP server if the operator of
the server has an evil (or illegal) intent. For example, the OP
client must block any operation that might stem from a vendetta
that the OP server operator might have against the user.
FR7: The OP client must not be able to be used to extract information
from a user's computer that is unrelated to illegal copies.
In order to minimize the threat to the privacy of the user, the
OP client must not be able to be used to extract information
from the user's computer that is not germane to determining if
the user has illegal copies of works or intends to use protected
works in illegal ways.
FR8: The OP client must be able to differentiate between protected
material that was placed on the user's computer by the user and
any material placed by others.
Discussion: It must not be possible for a third party to put
protected material on a user's computer for the purpose of
incriminating the user. The OP client must be able to know,
with certainty, who placed material on each computer, even in
the cases where a third party has physical access to an
unprotected computer or when the third party knows the user's
logname and password.
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FR9: The OP client must only implement the laws that apply to the
specific computer that it is running on.
Discussion: Since the Internet crosses many legal boundaries, an
OP client will have to know just where, in geo-political space,
the computer it is running in is currently located in order to
know what set of laws to apply when it is scanning the user's
computer. The OP client must also be able to be automatically
updated if the laws change or the computer is moved to a
location where the laws are different. Note that this
requirement also implies that the OP client knows where its OP
server is located to know if the client and server are both in
the same legal jurisdiction. The OP client must know what to
do, or not do, when they are not in the same legal jurisdiction.
The OP client must also include a mechanism to automatically
retrieve any applicable new laws or court decisions and properly
interpret them.
3. Security Considerations
The OP requires strong authentication of the clients and servers to
ensure that they cannot be spoofed. It also requires the use of
strong integrity technology to ensure that the messages between the
client and server cannot be modified in flight. It also requires
strong encryption to be sure that the communication between the
client and the server cannot be observed. All of this is required in
an environment where many of the users are in full control of their
computers and will be actively hostile to the reliable operation of
the protocol. Good luck.
4. Informative References
[Garratt v. Dailey] Supreme Court of Washington, 6 Wash. 2d 197;
279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
[GMPLS-WH] Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching
(GMPLS) for Worm Holes, work to be in process
[Guardian] "Senator proposes destruction of file-
swapping computers." The Guardian, June 19,
2003. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/
0,12271,980890,00.html)
[Holdsworth] Holdsworth, W., History of English Law
680-683 (1938)
[Processer] Prosser, W., et al., "Prosser and Keeton on
Torts," Hornbook Series, 5th ed., 1984
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[Restatement] 1. Restatement of the Law: sec 13 Torts
(American Law Institute) (1934)
[United States v. Wise] 550 F.2d 1180, 1194 (9th Cir.)
5. Authors Address
Scott Bradner
Harvard University
29 Oxford St.
Cambridge MA, 02138
EMail: sob@harvard.edu
Phone: +1 617 495 3864
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