Network Working Group A. Yegin, Ed.
Request for Comments: 4058 Samsung AIT
Category: Informational Y. Ohba
Toshiba
R. Penno
Juniper Networks
G. Tsirtsis
Flarion
C. Wang
ARO/NCSU
May 2005
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
Requirements
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
It is expected that future IP devices will have a variety of access
technologies to gain network connectivity. Currently there are
access-specific mechanisms for providing client information to the
network for authentication and authorization purposes. In addition
to being limited to specific access media (e.g., 802.1X for IEEE 802
links), some of these protocols are limited to specific network
topologies (e.g., PPP for point-to-point links). The goal of this
document is to identify the requirements for a link-layer agnostic
protocol that allows a host and a network to authenticate each other
for network access. This protocol will run between a client's device
and an agent in the network where the agent might be a client of the
AAA infrastructure.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Requirements Notation ...........................................3
3. Terminology .....................................................4
4. Requirements ....................................................4
4.1. Authentication .............................................4
4.1.1. Authentication of Client ............................4
4.1.2. Authorization, Accounting, and Access Control .......6
4.1.3. Authentication Backend ..............................7
4.1.4. Identifiers .........................................7
4.2. IP Address Assignment ......................................7
4.3. EAP Lower Layer Requirements ...............................7
4.4. PAA-to-EP Protocol .........................................8
4.5. Network ....................................................8
4.5.1. Multi-access ........................................8
4.5.2. Disconnect Indication ...............................8
4.5.3. Location of PAA .....................................9
4.5.4. Secure Channel ......................................9
4.6. Interaction with Other Protocols ..........................10
4.7. Performance ...............................................10
4.8. Congestion Control ........................................10
4.9. IP Version Independence ...................................10
4.10. Denial of Service Attacks ................................10
4.11. Client Identity Privacy ..................................10
5. Security Considerations ........................................11
6. Acknowledgements ...............................................11
A. Problem Statement ..............................................12
B. Usage Scenarios ................................................13
References ........................................................16
Normative References ...........................................16
Informative References .........................................16
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1. Introduction
Secure network access service requires access control based on the
authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Initial and subsequent client-to-network authentication
provides parameters that are needed to police the traffic flow
through the enforcement points. A protocol is needed to carry
authentication parameters between the client and the access network.
See Appendix A for the associated problem statement.
The protocol design will be limited to defining a messaging protocol
(i.e., a carrier) that will allow authentication payload to be
carried between the host/client and an agent/server in the access
network for authentication and authorization purposes regardless of
the AAA infrastructure that may (or may not) reside on the network.
As a network-layer protocol, it will be independent of the underlying
access technologies and applicable to any network topology.
The intent is not to invent new security protocols and mechanisms but
to reuse existing mechanisms such as EAP [RFC3748]. In particular,
the requirements do not mandate the need to define new authentication
protocols (e.g., EAP-TLS [RFC2716]), key distribution or key
agreement protocols, or key derivation methods. The desired protocol
can be viewed as the front-end of the AAA protocol or any other
protocol/mechanisms the network is running at the background to
authenticate its clients. It will act as a carrier for an already
defined security protocol or mechanism.
An example of a protocol being extended for use in authenticating a
host for network access is Mobile IPv4. A Mobile IPv4 registration
request message is used as a carrier for authentication extensions
(MN-FA [RFC3344] or MN-AAA [RFC3012]) that allows a foreign agent to
authenticate mobile nodes before providing forwarding service. The
goal of PANA is similar in that it aims to define a network-layer
transport for authentication information. However, PANA will be
decoupled from mobility management and will rely on other
specifications for the definition of authentication payloads.
This document defines common terminology and identifies requirements
of a protocol for PANA that will be used to define and limit the
scope of the work to be done in this group.
2. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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3. Terminology
PANA Client (PaC)
The client side of the protocol that resides in the host device
which is responsible for providing the credentials to prove its
identity for network access authorization.
PANA Client Identifier (PaCI)
The identifier that is presented by the PaC to the PAA for network
access authentication. A simple username and NAI [RFC2794] are
examples of PANA client identifiers.
Device Identifier (DI)
The identifier used by the network as a handle to control and
police the network access of a client. Depending on the access
technology, this identifier might contain an IP address, a link-
layer address, or a switch port number, etc. of a connected
device.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA)
The access network side entity of the protocol whose
responsibility is to verify the credentials provided by a PANA
client and grant network access service to the device associated
with the client and identified by a DI.
Enforcement Point (EP)
A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies
(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of
client devices. Information such as DI and (optionally)
cryptographic keys are provided by PAA per client for constructing
filters on the EP.
4. Requirements
4.1. Authentication
4.1.1. Authentication of Client
PANA MUST enable authentication of PaCs for network access. A PaC's
identity can be authenticated by verifying the credentials (e.g.,
identifier, authenticator) supplied by one of the users of the device
or the device itself. PANA MUST only grant network access service to
the device identified by the DI, rather than separate access to
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multiple simultaneous users of the device. Once network access is
granted to the device, methods used by the device on arbitrating
which user can access the network is outside the scope of PANA.
PANA MUST NOT define new security protocols or mechanisms. Instead,
it MUST be defined as a "carrier" for such protocols. PANA MUST
identify which specific security protocol(s) or mechanism(s) it can
carry (the "payload"). EAP is a candidate protocol that satisfies
many requirements for authentication. PANA would be a carrier
protocol for EAP. If the PANA Working Group decides that extensions
to EAP are needed, it will define requirements for the EAP WG instead
of designing such extensions.
Providing authentication, integrity and replay protection for data
traffic after a successful PANA exchange is outside the scope of this
protocol. In networks where physical layer security is not present,
link-layer or network-layer ciphering (e.g., IPsec) can be used to
provide such security. These mechanisms require the presence of
cryptographic keying material at PaC and EP. Although PANA does not
deal with key derivation or distribution, it enables this by carrying
EAP and allowing appropriate EAP method selection. Various EAP
methods are capable of generating basic keying material that cannot
be directly used with IPsec because it lacks the properties of an
IPsec SA (security association) including secure cipher suite
negotiation, mutual proof of possession of keying material, freshness
of transient session keys, key naming, etc. These basic (initial)
EAP keys can be used with an IPsec key management protocol, like IKE,
to generate the required security associations. A separate protocol,
called secure association protocol, is required to generate IPsec SAs
based on the basic EAP keys. This protocol MUST be capable of
enabling IPsec-based access control on the EPs. IPsec SAs MUST
enable authentication, integrity and replay protection of data
packets as they are sent between the EP and PaC.
Providing a complete secure network access solution by securing
router discovery [RFC1256], neighbor discovery [RFC2461], and
address resolution protocols [RFC826] is outside the scope as well.
Some access networks might require or allow their clients to get
authenticated and authorized by the network access provider (NAP) and
ISP before the clients gain network access. NAP is the owner of the
access network who provides physical and link-layer connectivity to
the clients. PANA MUST be capable of enabling two independent
authentication operations (i.e., execution of two separate EAP
methods) for the same client. Determining the authorization
parameters as a result of two separate authentications is an
operational issue and therefore outside the scope of PANA.
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Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to perform mutual
authentication for network access. Providing only the capability of
a PAA authenticating the PaC is not sufficient. Mutual
authentication capability is required in some environments but not in
all of them. For example, clients might not need to authenticate the
access network when physical security is available (e.g., dial-up
networks).
PANA MUST be capable of carrying out both periodic and on-demand re-
authentication. Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to initiate
both the initial authentication and the re-authentication process.
Certain types of service theft are possible when the DI is not
protected during or after the PANA exchange [RFC4016]. PANA MUST
have the capability to exchange DI securely between the PaC and PAA
where the network is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. While
PANA MUST provide such a capability, its utility relies on the use of
an authentication method that can generate keys for cryptographic
computations on PaC and PAA.
4.1.2. Authorization, Accounting, and Access Control
After a device is authenticated by using PANA, it MUST be authorized
for "network access." That is, the core requirement of PANA is to
verify the authorization of a PaC so that PaC's device may send and
receive any IP packets. It may also be possible to provide finer
granularity authorization, such as authorization for QoS or
individual services (e.g., http vs. ssh). However, while a backend
authorization infrastructure (e.g., RADIUS or Diameter based AAA
infra) might provide such indications to the PAA, explicit support
for them is outside the scope of PANA. For instance, PANA is not
required to carry any indication of the services authorized for the
authenticated device.
Providing access control functionality in the network is outside the
scope of PANA. Client access authentication SHOULD be followed by
access control to make sure only authenticated and authorized clients
can send and receive IP packets via the access network. Access
control can involve setting access control lists on the EPs. PANA
protocol exchange identifies clients that are authorized to access
the network. If IPsec-based access control is deployed in an access
network, PaC and EPs should have the required IPsec SA in place.
Generating the IPsec SAs based on EAP keys is outside the scope of
PANA protocol. This transformation MUST be handled by a separate
secure association protocol (see section 4.1.1).
Carrying accounting data is outside the scope of PANA.
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4.1.3. Authentication Backend
PANA protocol MUST NOT make any assumptions on the backend
authentication protocol or mechanisms. A PAA MAY interact with
backend AAA infrastructures such as RADIUS or Diameter, but it is not
a requirement. When the access network does not rely on an IETF-
defined AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS, Diameter), it can still use a
proprietary backend system, or rely on the information locally stored
on the authentication agents.
The interaction between the PAA and the backend authentication
entities is outside the scope of PANA.
4.1.4. Identifiers
PANA SHOULD allow various types of identifiers to be used as the PaCI
(e.g., username, Network Access Identifier (NAI), Fully Qualified
Domain Name (FQDN), etc.). This requirement generally relies on the
client identifiers supported by various EAP methods.
PANA SHOULD allow various types of identifiers to be used as the DI
(e.g., IP address, link-layer address, port number of a switch,
etc.).
A PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaCI and the
associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. This can be achieved by
PANA communicating the PaCI and DI to the PAA during the protocol
exchange. The DI can be carried either explicitly as part of the
PANA payload, or implicitly as the source of the PANA message, or
both. Multi-access networks also require use of a cryptographic
protection along with DI filtering to prevent unauthorized access
[RFC4016]. The keying material required by the cryptographic methods
needs to be indexed by the DI. As described in section 4.1.2, the
binding between DI and PaCI is used for access control and accounting
in the network.
4.2. IP Address Assignment
Assigning an IP address to the client is outside the scope of PANA.
PaC MUST configure an IP address before running PANA.
4.3. EAP Lower Layer Requirements
The EAP protocol imposes various requirements on its transport
protocols that are based on the nature of the EAP protocol, and need
to be satisfied for correct operation. Please see [RFC3748] for the
generic transport requirements that MUST be satisfied by PANA.
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4.4. PAA-to-EP Protocol
PANA does not assume that the PAA is always co-located with the
EP(s). Network access enforcement can be provided by one or more
nodes on the same IP subnet as the client (e.g., multiple routers),
or on another subnet in the access domain (e.g., gateway to the
Internet, depending on the network architecture). When the PAA and
the EP(s) are separated, another transport for client provisioning is
necessary. This transport is needed to create access control lists
in order to allow authenticated and authorized clients' traffic
through the EPs. PANA Working Group will preferably identify an
existing protocol solution that allows the PAA to deliver the
authorization information to one or more EPs when the PAA is
separated from EPs. Possible candidates include, but are not limited
to COPS, SNMP, Diameter, etc.
The communication between PAA and EP(s) MUST be secure. The
objective of using a PAA-to-EP protocol is to provide filtering rules
to EP(s) for allowing network access of a recently authenticated and
authorized PaC. The chosen protocol MUST be capable of carrying DI
and cryptographic keys for a given PaC from PAA to EP. Depending on
the PANA protocol design, support for either of the pull model (i.e.,
EP initiating the PAA-to-EP protocol exchange per PaC) or the push
model (i.e., PAA initiating the PAA-to-EP protocol exchange per PaC),
or both may be required. For example, if the design is such that the
EP allows the PANA traffic to pass through even for unauthenticated
PaCs, the EP should also allow and expect the PAA to send the
filtering information at the end of a successful PANA exchange
without the EP ever sending a request.
4.5. Network
4.5.1. Multi-access
PANA MUST support PaCs with multiple interfaces, and networks with
multiple routers on multi-access links. In other words, PANA MUST
NOT assume that the PaC has only one network interface, that the
access network has only one first hop router, or that the PaC is
using a point-to-point link.
4.5.2. Disconnect Indication
PANA MUST NOT assume that the link is connection-oriented. Links may
or may not provide disconnect indication. Such notification is
desirable in order for the PAA to clean up resources when a client
moves away from the network (e.g., inform the enforcement points that
the client is no longer connected). PANA SHOULD have a mechanism to
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provide disconnect indication. PANA MUST be capable of securing
disconnect messages in order to prevent malicious nodes from
leveraging this extension for DoS attacks.
This mechanism MUST allow the PAA to be notified about the departure
of a PaC from the network. This mechanism MUST also allow a PaC to
be notified about the discontinuation of the network access service.
Access discontinuation can occur due to various reasons such as
network systems going down or a change in the access policy.
In case the clients cannot send explicit disconnect messages to the
PAA, it can still detect their departure by relying on periodic
authentication requests.
4.5.3. Location of PAA
The PAA and PaC MUST be exactly one IP hop away from each other.
That is, there must be no IP routers between the two. Note that this
does not mean they are on the same physical link. Bridging and
tunneling (e.g., IP-in-IP, GRE, L2TP, etc.) techniques can place two
nodes just exactly one IP hop away from each other although they
might be connected to separate physical links. A PAA can be on the
network access server (NAS) or WLAN access point or first hop router.
The use of PANA when the PAA is multiple IP hops away from the PaC is
outside the scope of PANA.
A PaC may or may not be pre-configured with the IP address of PAA.
Therefore the PANA protocol MUST define a dynamic discovery method.
Given that the PAA is one hop away from the PaC, there are a number
of discovery techniques that could be used (e.g., multicast or
anycast) by the PaC to find out the address of the PAA.
4.5.4. Secure Channel
PANA MUST NOT assume the presence of a secure channel between the PaC
and the PAA. PANA MUST be able to provide authentication especially
in networks which are not protected against eavesdropping and
spoofing. PANA MUST enable protection against replay attacks on both
PaCs and PAAs.
This requirement partially relies on the EAP protocol and the EAP
methods carried over PANA. Use of EAP methods that provide mutual
authentication and key derivation/distribution is essential for
satisfying this requirement. EAP does not make a secure channel
assumption, and supports various authentication methods that can be
used in such environments. Additionally, PANA MUST ensure that its
design does not contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited when it
is used over insecure channels. PANA MAY provide a secure channel by
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deploying a two-phase authentication. The first phase can be used
for creation of the secure channel, and the second phase for client
and network authentication.
4.6. Interaction with Other Protocols
Mobility management is outside the scope of PANA. However, PANA MUST
be able to co-exist and MUST NOT unintentionally interfere with
various mobility management protocols, such as Mobile IPv4 [RFC3344],
Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775], fast handover protocols [FMIPv6] [FMIPv4], and
other standard protocols like IPv6 stateless address auto-
configuration [RFC2461] (including privacy extensions [RFC3041]), and
DHCP [RFC2131] [RFC3315]. PANA MUST NOT make any assumptions on the
protocols or mechanisms used for IP address configuration of the PaC.
4.7. Performance
PANA design SHOULD efficiently handle the authentication process in
order to gain network access with minimum latency. For example, it
may minimize the protocol signaling by creating local security
associations.
4.8. Congestion Control
PANA MUST provide congestion control for the protocol messaging.
Under certain conditions PaCs might unintentionally get synchronized
when sending their requests to the PAA (e.g., upon recovering from a
power outage on the access network). The network congestion
generated from such events can be avoided by using techniques like
delayed initialization and exponential back off.
4.9. IP Version Independence
PANA MUST work with both IPv4 and IPv6.
4.10. Denial of Service Attacks
PANA MUST be robust against a class of DoS attacks such as blind
masquerade attacks through IP spoofing. These attacks would swamp
the PAA, causing it to spend resources and prevent network access by
legitimate clients.
4.11. Client Identity Privacy
Some clients might prefer hiding their identity from visited access
networks for privacy reasons. Providing identity protection for
clients is outside the scope of PANA. Note that some authentication
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methods may already have this capability. Where necessary, identity
protection can be achieved by letting PANA carry such authentication
methods.
5. Security Considerations
This document identifies requirements for the PANA protocol design.
Due to the nature of this protocol, most of the requirements are
security related. The actual protocol design is not specified in
this document. A thorough discussion on PANA security threats can be
found in PANA Threat Analysis and Security Requirements [RFC4016].
Security threats identified in that document are already included in
this general PANA requirements document.
6. Acknowledgements
Authors would like to thank Bernard Aboba, Derek Atkins, Steven
Bellovin, Julien Bournelle, Subir Das, Francis Dupont, Dan Forsberg,
Pete McCann, Lionel Morand, Thomas Narten, Mohan Parthasarathy,
Basavaraj Patil, Hesham Soliman, and the PANA Working Group members
for their valuable contributions to the discussions and preparation
of this document.
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Appendix A. Problem Statement
Access networks in most cases require some form of authentication in
order to prevent unauthorized usage. In the absence of physical
security (and sometimes in addition to it) a higher layer (L2+)
access authentication mechanism is needed. Depending on the
deployment scenarios, a number of features are expected from the
authentication mechanism. For example, support for various
authentication methods (e.g., MD5, TLS, SIM, etc.), network roaming,
network service provider discovery and selection, separate
authentication for access (L1+L2) service provider and ISP (L3), etc.
In the absence of a link-layer authentication mechanism that can
satisfy these needs, operators are forced to either use non-standard
ad-hoc solutions at layers above the link, insert additional shim
layers for authentication, or misuse some of the existing protocols
in ways that were not intended by design. PANA will be developed to
fill this gap by defining a standard network-layer access
authentication protocol. As a network-layer access authentication
protocol, PANA can be used over any link-layer that supports IP.
DSL networks are a specific example where PANA has the potential for
addressing some of the deployment scenarios. Some DSL deployments do
not use PPP [RFC1661] as the access link-layer (IP is carried over
ATM and the subscriber device is either statically or DHCP-
configured). The operators of these networks are left either using
an application-layer web-based login (captive portal) scheme for
subscriber authentication, or providing a best-effort service only as
they cannot perform subscriber authentication required for the
differentiated services. The captive portal scheme is a non-standard
solution that has various limitations and security flaws.
PPP-based authentication can provide some of the required
functionality. But using PPP only for authentication is not a good
choice, as it incurs additional messaging during the connection setup
and extra per-packet processing. It also forces the network topology
to a point-to-point model. Aside from resistance to incorporating
PPP into an architecture unless it is absolutely necessary, there is
even interest in the community in removing PPP from some of the
existing architectures and deployments (e.g., 3GPP2, DSL).
Using Mobile IPv4 authentication with a foreign agent instead of
proper network access authentication is an example of protocol
misuse. The Registration Required flag allows a foreign agent to
force authentication even when the agent is not involved in any
Mobile IPv4 signalling (co-located care-of address case). This
enables the use of a mobility-specific protocol for an unrelated
functionality.
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PANA will carry EAP above IP in order to enable any authentication
method on any link-layer. EAP can already be carried by [IEEE-
802.1X] and PPP. IEEE 802.1X can only be used on unbridged IEEE 802
links, hence it only applies to limited link types. Inserting PPP
between IP and a link-layer can be perceived as a way to enable EAP
over that particular link-layer, but using PPP for this reason has
the aforementioned drawbacks and is not a good choice. While IEEE
802.1X and PPP can continue to be used in their own domains, they do
not take away the need to have a protocol like PANA.
Appendix B. Usage Scenarios
PANA will be applicable to various types of networks. Based on the
presence of lower-layer security prior to running PANA, the following
types cover all possibilities:
a) Physically secured networks (e.g., DSL networks). Although data
traffic is always carried over a physically secured link, the
client might need to be authenticated and authorized when
accessing the IP services.
b) Networks where L1-L2 is already cryptographically secured before
enabling IP (e.g., cdma2000 networks). Although the client is
authenticated on the radio link before enabling ciphering, it
additionally needs to get authenticated and authorized for
accessing the IP services.
c) No lower-layer security present before enabling IP. PANA is run
in an insecure network. PANA-based access authentication is used
to bootstrap cryptographic per-packet authentication and integrity
protection.
PANA is applicable to not only large-scale operator deployments with
full AAA infrastructure, but also to small disconnected deployments
like home networks and personal area networks.
Since PANA enables decoupling AAA from the link-layer procedures,
network access authentication does not have to take place during the
link establishment. This allows deferring client authentication
until the client attempts to access differentiated services (e.g.,
high bandwidth, unlimited access, etc.) in some deployments.
Additionally, multiple simultaneous network access sessions over the
same link-layer connection can occur as well.
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The following five scenarios capture the PANA usage model in
different network architectures with reference to its placement of
logical elements such as the PANA Client (PaC) and the PANA
Authentication Agent (PAA) with respect to the Enforcement Point (EP)
and the Access Router (AR). Note that PAA may or may not use AAA
infrastructure to verify the credentials of PaC in order to authorize
network access.
Scenario 1: PAA co-located with EP but separated from AR
In this scenario (Figure 1), PAA is co-located with the enforcement
point on which access control is performed. This might be the case
where PAA is co-located with the L2 access device (e.g., an IP-
capable switch).
PaC -----EP/PAA--+
|
+------ AR ----- (AAA)
|
PaC -----EP/PAA--+
Figure 1: PAA co-located with EP but separated from AR.
Scenario 2: PAA co-located with AR but separated from EP
In this scenario, PAA is not co-located with EPs but is placed on the
AR. Although we have shown only one AR here, there could be multiple
ARs, one of which is co-located with the PAA. Access control
parameters have to be distributed to the respective enforcement
points so that the corresponding device on which PaC is authenticated
can access the network. A separate protocol is needed between PAA
and EP to carry access control parameters.
PaC ----- EP --+
|
+------ AR/PAA --- (AAA)
|
PaC ----- EP --+
Figure 2: PAA co-located with AR but separated from EP
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Scenario 3: PAA co-located with EP and AR
In this scenario (Figure 3), PAA is co-located with the EP and AR on
which access control and routing are performed.
PaC ----- EP/PAA/AR--+
|
+-------(AAA)
|
PaC ----- EP/PAA/AR--+
Figure 3: PAA co-located with EP and AR.
Scenario 4: Separated PAA, EP, and AR
In this scenario, PAA is neither co-located with EPs nor with ARs.
It still resides on the same IP link as ARs. After successful
authentication, access control parameters will be distributed to
respective enforcement points via a separate protocol and PANA does
not play any explicit role in this.
PaC ----- EP -----+--- AR ---+
| |
PaC ----- EP --- -+ |
| |
PaC ----- EP -----+--- AR -- + ----(AAA)
|
+--- PAA
Figure 4: PAA, EP and AR separated.
Scenario 5: PAA separated from co-located EP and AR
In this scenario, EP and AR are co-located with each other but
separated from PAA. PAA still resides on the same IP link as ARs.
After successful authentication, access control parameters will be
distributed to respective enforcement points via a separate protocol
and PANA does not play any explicit role in this.
PaC --------------+--- AR/EP ---+
| |
PaC --------------+ |
| |
PaC --------------+--- AR/EP -- + ----(AAA)
|
+--- PAA
Figure 5: PAA separated from EP and AR.
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References
Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying
Authentication and Network Access (PANA) Threat
Analysis and Security Requirements", RFC 4016, March
2005.
Informative References
[FMIPv4] Malki, K., "Low Latency Handoffs in Mobile IPv4", Work in
Progress, June 2004.
[IEEE-802.1X] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based
Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X,
September 2001.
[RFC826] Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit
Ethernet address for transmission on Ethernet
hardware", STD 37, RFC 826, November 1982.
[RFC1256] Deering, S., "ICMP Router Discovery Messages", RFC
1256, September 1991.
[RFC1661] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD
51, RFC 1661, July 1994.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC
2131, March 1997.
Yegin, et al. Informational [Page 16]
RFC 4058 PANA Requirements May 2005
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December
1998.
[RFC2716] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication
Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.
[RFC2794] Calhoun, P. and C. Perkins, "Mobile IP Network Access
Identifier Extension for IPv4", RFC 2794, March 2000.
[RFC3012] Perkins, C. and P. Calhoun, "Mobile IPv4 Challenge/
Response Extensions", RFC 3012, November 2000.
[RFC3041] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041,
January 2001.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3344] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4", RFC 3344,
August 2002.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
Support in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[FMIPv6] Koodli, R., Ed., "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6", Work
in Progress.
Authors' Addresses
Alper E. Yegin (editor)
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology
75 West Plumeria Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Phone: +1 408 544 5656
EMail: alper.yegin@samsung.com
Yegin, et al. Informational [Page 17]
RFC 4058 PANA Requirements May 2005
Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc.
1 Telcordia Drive
Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA
Phone: +1 732 699 5305
EMail: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Reinaldo Penno
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive
Westford, MA 01886-3146
USA
EMail: rpenno@juniper.net
George Tsirtsis
Flarion
Bedminster One
135 Route 202/206 South
Bedminster, NJ 07921
USA
Phone: +44 20 88260073
EMail: G.Tsirtsis@Flarion.com
Cliff Wang
ARO/NCSU
316 Riggsbee Farm
Morrisville, NC 27560
USA
Phone: +1 919 548 4207
EMail: cliffwangmail@yahoo.com
Yegin, et al. Informational [Page 18]
RFC 4058 PANA Requirements May 2005
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
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Internet Society.
Yegin, et al. Informational [Page 19]
RFC, FYI, BCP